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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the PAH in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. While developing its own 
research projects, the Centre works in close relation with the four departments 





























































































Programme in Eastern Europe
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The Schuman Centre's Programme on Eastern Europe promotes the development of 
interdisciplinary research focusing on Central and Eastern Europe. Challenges, 
opportunities and dilemmas confronting the European Union in its relations with 
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In tro d u c tio n
A century ago about half the population of the area under consideration was 
identified with one ethnic minority or another; sixty years ago the proportion 
was still about one-quarter. Today, although quantitative approximations are 
extremely problematic, it might be estimated that no more than one-tenth of the 
population in East Central Europe belongs to an ethnic minority.1 Nevertheless, 
the problems associated with minorities have not declined proportionately. 
Unlike immediately neighbouring regions, such as Moldova and the rest of ex- 
Yugoslavia, minority problems here have not exploded into armed conflict and 
they are not likely to do so. However, they continue to weigh considerably on 
the internal evolution of the area and on its future relations with the EU.
It might well be argued that the minority issue is a symptom and that the 
underlying problem is the dominant conception of the state in East Central 
Europe. Even more than elsewhere the state here is perceived as the exclusive 
state of the titular majority. From this perspective, minorities are viewed as 
peripheral and even illegitimate. Their presence constitutes a reminder that the 
state does not correspond to its image of itself and their development raises 
fears that the nature of the state will be put into question. In this sense, one 
could say that it is not minorities but majorities that are the problem. Moreover, 
one might add that it is the weakness of the state rather than the strength of the 
minorities which lies at the root of the problem.
The exclusivist conception of the state, with its consequences for the 
minority issue, is a common feature of all the countries under examination here, 
regardless of the very significant distinctions in the weight and situation of 
minorities among them. Four countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Hungary) have minority populations not exceeding 10% of the total population. 
With the exception of Roma, these minorities are not salient. In four other 
countries (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania) minorities comprise up 
to 25% of the population. Here, certain minority groups constitute compact and 
distinct societies and they are an important factor in national politics. Finally, in 
two countries (Latvia and Estonia) minorities, in fact, a single Russian-speaking 
or Slavic minority, exceed 30% of the population.
In accordance with the terms of reference of this project, this paper deals with Bulgaria, The 
Czech Republic, Estonia. Hungary, Latvia. Lithuania, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
An earlier draft of this paper was presented to the Reflection Group on ‘Long-Term 
Implications of EU Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border,’ Florence 18-19 June 1998.1 
am grateful to all the participants who commented on the draft and, in particular to Gaetano 



























































































The similarity of attitudes towards minorities as well as the dynamics of 
minority life in East Central Europe may explain the similarity of minority 
grievances throughout the area. It is therefore tempting to assume that the 
situation of minority groups is similar in the various countries and that the 
condition of the various minorities within each country is also comparable. 
Such assumptions would not be justified. There is a considerable gap between 
the minority-friendly policy pioneered by Hungary, the lukewarm or indifferent 
stance of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the recently-tempered 
hostility of Romania and Lithuania, the continued animosity of Bulgaria and 
Slovakia, and the confrontational positions of Latvia and Estonia. There is an 
even greater discrepancy between the situation of minorities connected to 
Western home countries, such as Germans and Jews, and minorities with only 
regional patrons, such as Hungarians, Poles, Turks and Russians, or no patrons 
at all such as Ruthenes, Pomaks or Kashubes. Above all, there is a profound 
gulf between the condition, both objective and subjective, of all other East 
Central European minority groups and the Roma who happen to be by far the 
most numerous and the most problematic minority.
These numerous divergences imply that it is not practical to seek a 
unified strategy of coping with the minority issue just as it is unrealistic to 
expect the peaceful assimilation of minorities along imagined Western patterns. 
In the following pages we shall first examine the historical foundations of East 
Central Europe’s specificity with regard to minorities. We shall then look at the 
mainsprings of current minority demands in the context of prevailing legal and 
policy regimes. Finally, we shall consider the regional and international 
implications of minority issues in the foreseeable future.'
Historical Background
‘Discontinuity’ and ‘empire’ are two terms which provide the key to the 
historical situation of East Central Europe’s minorities and, indeed, to the 
history of the region as a whole. It is these terms too that define the most 
significant contrast between East and West European development.3
Western European political and linguistic boundary changes over the 
centuries have been moderate, compared to those in East Central Europe. They 
have, nevertheless, been the source of considerable turmoil and they continue to 
impinge upon daily life and politics in Western Europe.4 One can therefore 
understand the profound impact of repeated and acute boundary modifications 
in East Central Europe, continuing virtually up to the present day and far 




























































































Comparing maps from one period to another one finds entire countries that are 
displaced. For example, 10lh century Bulgaria appears where Serbia is later to be 
found and 13lh century Serbia is located in present-day Bosnia; Poland's 
boundaries today resemble those it possessed at the beginning of its state 
existence but they are quite different from those it displayed in the intervening 
thousand years.
Such discontinuities can be attributed in part to the absence of natural 
boundaries in the area and to the unstable demarcation among languages and 
dialects, notably Slavic ones. For the most part, however, these discontinuities 
are historically determined. Although both Western and East Central Europe 
were formed through the invasion or migration of peoples from the East, these 
movements continued to occur in East Central Europe long after they had 
ceased in the West. The Magyar presence is the most persistent confirmation of 
this reality.5 Whereas in the middle ages East Central Europe appeared to be 
embarking upon a process of state-building which resembled and even 
anticipated that in the West none of these medieval states survived into the 
modern period. A sovereign Poland, Bohemia, Flungary and Bulgaria arose 
almost as early as the post-Carolingian French state and they preceded British, 
Spanish and Swedish statehood. It must be added, however, that these East 
Central European states disappeared and only reappeared well after the process 
of state formation in the West had been completed.
What was happening to East Central Europe at the time that Western 
Europe was developping the modem territorial state, between the 16lh and the 
19lh century? Without a single exception the peoples of the area were falling 
under the sway of imperial rule of one sort or another. Once again, the natural 
configuration of the area favoured such an outcome. The Lands Between,’ as 
they have been gracefully designated, happen to lie between large and powerful 
imperial units.6 From the West, the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanic 
Nation, The Habsburg Empire. Prussia and Germany have all exercised cultural, 
military and political hegemony over large parts of East Central Europe at one 
time or another. From the East, Moscovy, the Russian Empire and the Soviet 
Union have dominated parts of the area by virtue of their superior force. 
Moreover, for several centuries, a Southern neighbour, the Ottoman empire, 
controlled the Balkans politically and defined them socially. It is salutary to 
recall that one of the countries considered here, Bulgaria, was still formally 
under Ottoman suzerainty until 1908.
The implications of these historical processes are significant, both for 
majorities and minorities in East Central Europe. Majorities or the titular 




























































































states are small, weak and fragile, and that, historically speaking, their very 
existence is an exception rather than a rule. East Central European intellectuals, 
such as Milan Kundera and Istvan Bibo, have remarked on the existential 
distress of these small nations, where the question of survival -  an absurd 
question for the old continuous states of Western Europe is -  is posed ever 
anew.7 Whereas the English sing “there will always be an England," the Poles 
comfort themselves with the lyrics “Poland is not yet lost while we are alive”.
Minorities in East Central Europe are living testimony to the meanders of 
the past, and perhaps also to the uncertainties of the future. Like archaeological 
layers, they recount a history: that of the Turks in Bulgaria, the Hungarians in 
Romania and in Slovakia, the Germans in Poland, the Czech Republic and 
elsewhere, the Poles in Lithuania, and the Russians in Latvia and Estonia. 
Moreover, the history they recount is one of past domination. It is the negation 
of piously cultivated narratives of continuity and of identity between a land, a 
state and a majority people. Minorities are a disturbing reminder that, in 
political terms, Slovakia was not always Slovak, the Czech Republic was not 
Czech, Bulgaria was not Bulgarian and so on. At the very least, they recall that 
even recently parts of today’s Poland were not Polish as parts of Romania were 
not Romanian. Inasmuch as the legitimacy of state units in East Central Europe 
is founded, to an even greater extent than in Western Europe, upon myths of 
national continuity, nay, of perennity, minorities are an unwelcome presence.
Current Situation
Why have minority issues attained such prominence in the immediate aftermath 
of the fall of communism? Scholars frett over whether the minority issue is now 
one of old wine in new bottles or of new wine in old bottles.8 Meanwhile, 
explanations and interrogations concerning the ‘return of minorities’ continue to 
abound, usually connected to speculation about post-communist nationalism in 
general. The early ‘icebox’ theory, according to which the demise of 
communism ‘unfroze’ hoary national sentiments turned out to be more 
successful as an image than as an argument. It was supplanted by the ‘vacuum’ 
or ‘default option’ theory which stated that ethnic identity and nationalism 
stepped into the ideological void left by the disappearance of Marxism- 
Leninism and by the weakness of alternative value systems. Neither explanation 
has led to much in the way of a coherent Western policy, other than distaste for 





























































































More satisfying than other explanations has been the ‘ethnic allocation’ 
model which argues that ethnicity has become one, sometimes the principal 
criterion for the distribution of scarce resources in the post-communist 
countries. The model usually, but not necessarily, points to ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurs’ as key agents in the process. This approach has the merit of 
highlighting an important but neglected fact: minority tensions, such as those 
we have been experiencing in the last years, come to the fore when a preceding 
equilibrium, however unsatisfactory, has been broken. As the economic, 
political and social spheres change radically, groups, like individuals, are 
obliged to reposition themselves. They carve out their place in the new order, 
seek out and defend the most satisfactory niches, and realign themselves with 
respect to rivals. This is an inherently conflictual process fought for high stakes. 
Minorities participate in it as do other groups.10 Let us note, in passing, that no 
new equilibrium has yet been established in respect to the minority issue 
anywhere in the post-communist world.
To understand this process fully, it should be noted that the minority 
question was not entirely absent during the communist period, as is sometimes 
alleged. To be sure, state and party control of the media meant that minorities 
were only granted as much attention as the authorities allowed, and minority 
conflicts, real or potential, were ignored. The range of communist options for 
dealing with minorities, however, was fundamentally the same as that of their 
post-communist successors. The communists could ignore the existence of 
minorities, they could coopt and channel minority sentiment in a non­
threatening direction, or they could recognize and formalize the status of 
minorities by granting them autonomy of one sort or another. Thus, Poland 
consistently refused to acknowledge any sort of German presence. Bulgaria 
sought to assimilate its Turks and Pomaks and, eventually, to expel those who 
could not be assimilated. Slovaks in Hungary, Poles in Lithuania and small 
minority groups in other communist states were allowed to set up carefully 
controlled cultural associations. As Romania emancipated itself from Soviet 
tutelage, it curbed the Hungarian autonomy that it had previously granted. On 
the other hand, Slovenia and Slovakia constituted distinct, ethnically defined 
units within a federal state, as did the three Baltic republics in the more 
restrictive conditions of the USSR.
What has changed today is that it no longer possible for states to ignore 
the existence of minority groups which insist on being heard. In Poland, not 
only the previously unacknowledged Germans and the barely recognized 
Ukrainians and Belarussians but the formerly overlooked Kashubes have staked 
out their place on the ethnic landscape.11 The Czech Republic has not granted 




























































































has defined a system of minority institutions which is both organisationally 
elaborate and politically marginal. In these countries minorities are more visible 
than they were previously. At least potentially they have powerful instruments 
at their disposition, such as a free media, an unrestricted right of association, 
and some sympathy abroad, though not matched by sympathy at home.
In those countries where minorities are more numerous and more 
prominent, they are more assertive today than they were in the past, they are 
better organized and they carry definite political weight. From their point of 
view, however, their actual achievements are disappointing. Thus, the 
Hungarians of Romania and Slovakia, like the Turks of Bulgaria, feel that they 
have little to show for their efforts of the last years, and that whatever specific 
gains they have made have not been accompanied by general societal 
acceptance. In some respects, the situation of minorities may even have 
encountered a setback. Because of the fate of the three federal communist states 
(Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, USSR), federalism itself or even more mild 
versions of territorial autonomy have become taboo since they are considered 
stepping-stones towards separatism and disintegration. Because of the general 
reassertion of nationalist sentiment, anti-minority political formations find a 
sympathetic hearing and an electoral following.
The question of economic well-being, factual or perceived, dominates the 
agenda of post-communism. The experience of minorities in this respect is 
therefore a key component of their overall situation. Living standards fell 
radically for all social groups (as opposed to some individuals) with the 
introduction of the market economy and, for the most part, standards have been 
rising only slowly and hesistantly.12 Economic insecurity remains far higher 
than it was in the communist period. In the light of this situation, the question is 
not whether minorities have gained economically but whether they have lost 
more or less than others. Once again, no general answer is possible. A number 
of minorities has been particularly hard hit by the ‘transition.’ This has been the 
case for those prominently represented in obsolescent sectors of the economy: 
Turkish agricultural workers in Bulgaria, Russians in heavy industry in the 
Baltic countries, Hungarians in the primary and secondary sectors in Slovakia. 
Minorities inhabiting advanced areas, such as the Germans in Polish Silesia or 
the Hungarians in parts of Transylvania have struggled to keep their edge with 
respect to the national economy with varied results.
In the final analysis, however, the economic question as it affects the 
minority issue is one of perception. If minorities are seen as profiting from the 
transition more than the majority population (or, at least, suffering less), 




























































































Roma. By all accounts they are the most miserable social and ethnic group in 
the area and their overall situation has deteriorated since the social safety net of 
communism disappeared. Yet, the Roma minority has become the focus of 
social frustration for various reasons. Roma are conspicuously different in terms 
of consumption patterns and life style and they are easily identifiable. Long 
involved in the shadow economy they are now also prominently represented in 
both petty and organized criminal activities. A well-defined ethnic group which 
is perceived to be preying upon the rest of society in order to avoid the rigours 
of transition is a veritable lightening rod for social resentment.13
Tendencies
The premise underlying discussion of EU enlargement in East Central Europe is 
that, sooner or later, the outcome of the economic transition will be some sort of 
stable and, it is hoped, prosperous economic order. In these future 
circumstances it is likely that another dimension of the minority issue, namely 
that of identity politics will come to the fore. Already today, as the East Central 
European countries come under the influence of current West European 
intellectual and cultural values the politics of recognition and of identity are 
emerging as a new feature of the ideological landscape.14
Nationalism, as an expression of the majority’s identity, shows little sign 
of losing importance within the political culture of the East Central European 
states. Generally speaking, overtly nationalist parties have not fared best since 
the onset of democratization but this has been because all other parties have 
become nationalist to a greater or lesser degree. The glorification of national 
history and the assiduous restoration of national symbols have been high on the 
agenda of post-communist governments. Obviously, this has heightened the 
sense of exclusion among ethnic minorities but it has also made them receptive 
to ideologies and strategies of counter-affirmation.
In response to the persistent dominance of majority groups and inspired 
by Western preoccupation with minority rights and ethnic revival, East Central 
European minorities are increasingly receptive to the idea that cultures cannot 
be assessed on a scale of ‘higher’ or ‘lower,’ that all ethnic groups should be 
recognized as equally worthy of respect, and, in particular, that numbers are not 
determinant of status so that even small minorities deserve equal recognition. 
For the moment, these considerations lead towards demands for equality of 
treatment rather than calls for affirmative action (positive discrimination).15 At 




























































































ethnic pride, compensation for past victimhood and redress of present 
discrimination.
The culture of subjectivity and the politics of identity will not only 
legitimate demands based on identity but will also dramatically expand the 
bases for identity. In addition to traditional religous, language and ethnic bases, 
identity in the future may well be founded on gender, sexual preference, or life­
style considerations. These new identity groups may, in the long run, upstage 
ethnic minorities although, in the first instance, they will probably reenforce 
them and, in the second instance, they will supersede them. For example, we 
shall find not only Hungarian minority associations in Slovakia but Hungarian 
homosexual minority associations as separate groups. There is really no limit to 
the proliferation of such identity formations. The multiplication of affinities 
along with the combination of ‘ressentiment’ and narcissim will provide an 
abundant and inflammable fuel for minority demands.
The implications of these trends are that minorities will emerge 
strengthened, both subjectively and objectively. Existing organized minorities 
will be more affirmative in their demands, incipient minorities will develop self- 
consciousness, new minorities will arise. Forcible assimilation of minorities is 
already banned, at least by international convention, and voluntary assimilation 
will become less respectable. To be sure, the visible differences between 
minorities and majorities may become less noticeable in an increasingly 
uniform urban and modem setting. Diminution of objective differences does not 
mean though that minorities will abandon their distinct subjective identity nor 
the agenda that flows from it.
The process we are describing is a diffuse and inchoate one but it is 
already perceptible. Poland is witnessing not only the affirmation of its more 
substantial minorities, such as the Germans, the Ukrainians and the 
Belarussians, but also of such numerically insignificant communities as the 
Jews and of groups striving for recognition such as the Kashubes. Hungary’s 
national minority policy is designed to maintain minorities in existence and 
these minorities are making claims on the national agenda and national budget. 
The revival of the Ruthene identity, in part through efforts from abroad, affects 
Slovakia and Poland as well as countries outside our purview, notably Ukraine 
and Yugoslavia.16 In the Czech Republic, Slovaks, indistiguishable in most 
respects from the Czechs, have organized as an ethnic minority. The 
relegalisation of churches, such as the Uniates, and the vigour of Islam have 
also bolstered ethnic identity. Post communist national censuses confirm that 
earlier tendencies are being reversed and that more individuals now choose to 




























































































remains to be seen whether such developments will gravitate towards the realm 
of symbolic or of effective politics.
Legal and Policy Regimes
A telling aspect of the minority question in East Central Europe is the 
discrepancy between the spirit of these countries’ constitutional regimes and the 
international legal regimes to which they are ready to subscribe. In no other area 
is there as profound a gulf between the desire for national self-affirmation and 
the wish to integrate into a larger unit.
The preambles of many post-communist constitutions confirm 
resoundingly the identification between the political order and the titular nation. 
The state is routinely presented as the emanation, the incarnation, or the 
property of the majority nation. Some preambles also seize the occasion to 
articulate a view of history from which past or present minorities are absent.17 
Constitutions mention national minorities in general terms, sometimes 
employing circumlocutions or alluding to them residually (e.g. ‘citizens whose 
native tongues are not Bulgarian’). They guarantee minority rights for 
individuals but not for collectivities, thus frustrating a key minority demand. 
The limitations of these provisions come to the fore when compared with those 
of the Hungarian constitution which specifically states that ‘national and ethnic 
minorities share the power of the people - they are constituent factors in the 
state’ and which recognizes minorities as collective rights-bearing entities.
Underlying these new constitutions is a jacobin conception of ‘La 
République, une et indivisible’18 Territorial autonomy is banned, explicitly or 
implicitly. There might well be solid reasons for doing so: autonomous 
territorial units may simply replicate the exclusivist logic of the nation state on 
a smaller scale, they invariably create new minorities among those not 
belonging to the titular people of the new unit, they may foster a ghetto 
mentality, they can act as an incitement to separatism. All these objections to 
terrtitorial autonomy are weighty enough. It remains true, however, that 
territorial autonomy or federalism has functioned successfully as a mechanism 
for managing minority problems in various parts of the world. It is regrettable, 
though comprehensible in the light of recent experience, that federalism should 
arouse such panic in the ex-communist states.
Constitutions are not necessarily the best guide to state practice because 
of their general nature and exhortative function. In dealing with minorities 




























































































rights or guarantees ‘as provided by law.’ Consequently, confrontation between 
the state and its minorities often focuses on particular laws concerning language 
(Slovakia), education (Romania), citizenship (Estonia, Latvia) or on a 
combination of these and other specific issues (eg. toponyms, personal names, 
flags and other symbols). In most cases what counts is the spirit of the laws and 
of their application. Inasmuch as trust between the states and their minorities is 
minimal, however, much energy is dissipated in bickering over the wording and 
interpretation of these laws.
It is often in response to such disputes that minority issues are 
internationalized. All the countries discussed here belong to the Council of 
Europe and to the OSCE and it is these organisations which have taken an 
increasing interest in setting norms and in intervening in minority-related 
conflicts. The Council of Europe adopted a European Charter of Regional and 
Minority Languages (1992) but it has been slow in obtaining ratification. The 
Council’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(1995) has very recently come into force and is heralded as a major 
breakthrough in minority protection. Since the end of the Cold War the OSCE 
has adopted a number of declarations relating to minority protection. Most 
significantly, it has established the Office of a High Commissioner for National 
Minorities (headed by the former Dutch foreign minister, Max van der Stoel) 
who has worked tirelessly as a mediator and rapporteur throughout the ex- 
communist world. Of course, there are also UN bodies dealing with minority 
isssues, notably the sub-committee on minorities within the human rights 
commission. The EU has only stepped into this area warily and indirectly, by 
way of the ‘Plan Balladur’ (1995), formally sponsored by the OSCE, which 
called upon prospective entrants into the Union to settle among themselves 
frontier and related issues, such as minorities, before proceeding with the 
adherence process.
The internationalization of the minority issue has created a dilemma for a 
number of East Central European states. On the one hand, they resent the 
outside interference and the assault on their sovereignty, much as they did in the 
interwar period when the League of Nations monitored compliance with the 
minority treaties imposed upon the East Central Europeans by the victorious 
great powers. On the other hand, they are keen to argue their case inasmuch as 
rapprochement with Western countries is their top international priority. Indeed, 
Hungary has made internationalization of the minority issue a linchpin of its 
policy with regard to Hungarians abroad.
Quite striking is the uncontrite tone of the East Central European states’ 




























































































they are acting in good faith and in a reasonable manner, that minority 
complaints are exaggerated and stoked from abroad. The contrast between such 
attitudes, shared by public opinion, and the growing stridency of minority 
spokesmen suggests that the parties to conflict may be growing apart rather than 
coming together. It is indeed true that East Central European minority groups 
are following the lead of Western NGOs and international institutions which, all 
too often, have little specific understanding of. the area and automatically 
assume strident stances. Moreover, it must be grating for post-communist 
governments to hear ‘standard of civilisation’ arguments from countries where 
minority conflicts are more violent than any in East Central Europe (Northern 
Ireland, Corsica, Basque country) and where instances of deplorable treatment 
of minorities abound (as some critics put it, it is safer to be a Turk in Bulgarian 
than in Germany). At the same time, if the East Central Europeans are indeed 
seeking Western respect and equal recognition they cannot avoid having the 
highest Western standards in regard to minorities invoked as a norm.
Relations with Neighbouring Countries
There is a fundamental difference between the present time and the interwar 
period when minorities were last a bone of contention within the area: today 
none of the countries under examination will go to war over the minority issue. 
In this respect, Hungary’s turnabout has been the most spectacular. Internal 
large scale violence too is not envisaged against minorities. One cannot be as 
categorical in regard to border issues but it is only marginal political formations 
which call overtly for border changes and it is assumed that these changes 
would be carried out peacefully.
At the same time, minority considerations enter into the relations of the 
East Central European countries with each other and with the outside world. 
The case of Hungary is most obvious The fate of three million compatriots 
abroad (almost one-third of the population of Hungary itself) has been a 
dominant theme of Hungrian internal and foreign policy under virtually all 
regimes. Most recently, it has dictated Hungary’s policies in regard to its own 
internal minorities. Hungary’s generosity towards them was expected to serve 
as an example for the neighbouring countries and as a basis for reciprocity. In 
this respect, the experience has been disappointing. The West has applauded 
Hungarian policies but Romania, Slovakia, Yugoslavia have reacted with 
suspicion and they, as well as Ukraine, have shown little inclination to follow 
the Hungarian example. Within Hungary itself, the vigour with which the 
question of the diaspora is pursued varies with the governments in power. As 




























































































support for it is ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard.’ If this policy remains unreciprocated 
among all the countries in the area, if its beneficiaries show themselvs 
ungrateful, disloyal or demanding and, for whatever reasons, become unpopular 
(as is already the case for the Roma) one may will ask whether this policy will 
persist.
Sooner rather then later, the Hungarian government may be called to 
present its accounts with respect to its policies on behalf of the diaspora. It will 
have to acknowledge that the bilateral treaties signed with Slovakia and 
Romania, within the framework of the OSCE/EU’s ‘Plan Balladur’, have 
become a supplementary source of dispute as quarrels over interpretation 
abound.19 The conclusion that might have to be drawn is that the fate of 
Hungarian communities in the neighbouring countries depends 
onverwhelmingly on the internal politics of these countries. Hungarians in 
Romania made (temporary?) gains when the Democratic Convention 
government came to power in late 1996. Improvement of the situation of the 
Hungarians of Slovakia depends on the defeat of the Meciar government. What 
are the conclusions that Budapest (and the Hungarian minorities) will draw if it 
realizes that it is powerless to act as a protector of Hungarians abroad?
Other East Central European countries have not shown as much interest 
in the fate of their co-nationals abroad, which does not mean that they do not 
have diaspora communities nor that they will show forebearance in the future. 
Poland is sympathetic to the plight of Poles in the ex-Soviet Union (one to two 
million people), notably in Russia and Kazakhstan, but seems to prefer to leave 
the matter to the Church and other voluntary organisations. It is relieved that the 
Polish minority in Ukraine (220.000 - 400.000) has not become an issue, both 
because of Ukraine’s policies and because of the generally good relations 
between the two countries. Poland is also satisfied that the Polish minority in 
Lithuania, after having opposed Lithuanian independence and then complained 
about political discrimination, now appears to be more docile. It is concerned, 
however, that political developments in Belorussia may force attention upon the 
Polish minority there (400.000 -  500.000).
Several countries are suspected of demonstrating concern for their co­
nationals abroad only for opportunistic or retaliatory reasons. Slovakia 
complains about the fate of Slovaks in Hungary, although the latter are not only 
far less numerous than their Hungarian counterparts in Slovakia and they are 
integrated almost to the point of assimilation (which provides addditional 
grounds for complaint). Slovenia responds to Italian criticism of its failure to 
make amends for the expulsions of Italians and confiscations of property of 




























































































(90.000) is thirty times superior in number to the Italians in Slovenia, but the 
issue only makes a dent in Italian local politics whereas it is of national 
importance in Slovenia.
Countries outside the area also demonstrate concern for their co­
nationals. The most weighty of such cases is that of Russia vis-à-vis Latvia and 
Estonia (Lithuania’s policies towards its much smaller Russian minority have 
not drawn complaints). At present, the key issue is that of granting citizenship 
to the great number of Russians who settled during Soviet times. Inasmuch as 
statelessness is a violation of human rights and the citizenship requirements of 
these Baltic countries are designed to discriminate against a particular category 
of candidates, Moscow’s case for protecting Russians (and other former 
Soviets) is a strong one. As the issue of citizenship moves towards resolution by 
way of inclusion, largely under international rather than Russian pressure, the 
nature of the problem changes. These new citizens will be able to run their own 
candidates for national office and they will weigh heavily on political outcomes. 
If they organize along ethnic lines, setting up Russian minority parties and 
electoral lists, they will end up by transforming these countries into binational 
and bilingual states. This is precisely what ethnic Latvians and Estonians are 
desperate to avoid but, instead of seeking an agreement with their Russian- 
speakers while the latter are still disenfranchised, they have been inclined to 
stall.
Other outside countries are far more discrete in defending their co­
nationals. Germany has a long-standing policy of reaching out to Germans 
abroad, previously for the purpose of bringing them ‘back’ to Germany, more 
recently in order to foster German culture and to promote the welfare of 
Germans remaining abroad. Germany is treading very lightly in this domain, for 
historical reasons. In fact, it does not even need to make much of an effort at 
protection. The countries of the area (with the exception of Poland which 
behaves more reservedly) are only too eager to act benevolently with regard to 
their local Germans in light of the economic importance that Germany has for 
East Central Europe. Another outside state which may be returning to parts of 
the area is Turkey but, of the countries with which we are concerned this 






























































































Let us assume, by way of a thought experiment, that ten years or so from now 
all the East Central European countries examined here are members of the 
European Union. What then will be the situation of ethnic minorities in this 
enlarged Europe?
One may suppose that the minority factor will become far more important 
to EU politics than it is at present. This will occur because trends and realities 
from both parts of the Union will converge in a highly dynamic combination. 
On the one hand, the Union will contain a significant number of new members 
with important but marginalized minorities. On the other hand, it will be made 
up of old members where minorities are more integrated and less numerous but 
where a culture of minority promotion and of minority rights has been 
developping (often in terms of régionalisation). West European minorities will 
find themselves reenforced, perhaps reinvigorated, and will intensify their 
strategies aiming at European-wide recognition. At the same time, in the new 
members of the Union minorities will invoke West European precedents and 
norms to pursue their case in favour of an improved status, including greater 
cultural autonomy and, in some cases, territorial autonomy. In these 
circumstances it is difficult to imagine the indefinite continuation of what 
Bruno de Witte has aptly called the EU’s “agnosticism” towards minorities 
residing within its member states.20
To be sure, tensions might be reduced by the new element of mobility. In 
the forefront of those who will avail themselves of the opportunity to cross 
borders freely will be minority members who will gravitate towards the 
countries of their language or ethnic kin to take up jobs and, in the long run, to 
settle down. This factor may, just as easily, operate in a reverse direction. 
Diaspora communities have always been important to the development of 
nationalism and today’s ease of communierions means that they can play an 
even greater role in the politics of the land they have left.21 Moreover, mobility 
will eventually force a reformulation of the very term minority. At present, 
though there is no univerally accepted definition of the term, there is agreement 
that a minority must be made up of citizens of the country of residence." Thus, 
Turks in Germany are not a Turkish minority in Germany and the only Polish 
minority in Germany is that made up of German citizens, a qualification which 
limits the weight of this group both numerically and conceptually. Such 
restrictions will no longer be tenable in a Union where everyone shares 
European citizenship. This does not mean, however, that members of the Union 




























































































patterns of earlier interventions on behalf of minorities. In fact, the opposite 
will probably be the case.
A possible development in this future enlarged Union will be pressure 
towards an increase in the number of euroregions and other trans-border 
arrangements. At present, euroregions and the like are regarded with suspicion 
by the states of East Central Europe, as alibis for outside interference and 
tampering with borders. This is why Poland has been unenthusiastic about 
creating any such arrangements in Silesia, Slovakia has refused to consider 
them for Ruthenia (with Ukraine), and there is nothing of this sort between 
Hungary and Romania. It would be most encouraging if such resistance could 
be overcome. The realisation that trans-border cooperation, especially involving 
ethnic minorities, can be mutually beneficial could alter perceptions 
significantly. Certainly this is a less controversial project than that of 
introducing or reintroducing territorial autonomy or federalist strucutres which 
will continue to suscitate anxiety.
As the East Central European countries enter the European Union, they 
will experience a series of changes affecting their sovereignty and their 
effective powers. Whatever their gains in other areas they will be weakened qua 
states, and therefore power relations between majorities and minorities within 
these states, as well as within the EU as a whole, will change. How both parties 
react to these changes is a matter for speculation. By way of conclusion, let us 
recall that minorities imply majorities and both assume the one-nation state as 
the norm of political organization. Franz Josef spoke of his “peoples” rather 
than of “minorities” within Austria-Hungary and the Swiss today do not refer to 
the French-speaking or Italian-speaking population as minorities. In both cases, 
we are faced with pre-modem political conceptions which, in some curious and 
as yet undetermined way, may be appropriate for a post modem political world 
as well. In the meantime, we have to manage the question of minorities within a 




























































































Minority statistics constitute a great illusion. Under the appearance of scientific 
certainty and mathematical precision they conceal, advertently or inadvertently, 
a world of differing degrees and conceptions of identity, diverging definitions, 
and unstable classifications. The uncertain or unreliable character of minority 
statistics holds true even if one discounts conscious falsification by state 
authorities, which has not been unknown in the past. Indeed, the obstacles to a 
reliable count come both from above and from below.
Census categories are established by state authorities and reflect their 
vision of the state. Instead of documenting reality, some interwar governments 
introduced the amalgamated categories of Czchoslovak and Serbo-Croatian to 
express a nation-building project. In the post-war period, states have sometimes 
been creative in inventing census categories, in order to avoid problems of 
attribution among established groups, to weaken these groups numerically, or to 
promote new groupings. This is the origin of the categories of Muslims, in the 
ethnic sense, and of Macedonians in ex-Yugoslavia. In Romania the authorities 
have distinguished between Szeklers and Magyars or German and Saxons to 
diminish the weight of the larger groups.
Authorities may ask a variety of questions to determine minority status 
The most common criterion is language but this is often problematic. For 
example, the main language of most Hungarian Roma is Hungarian, and 
therefore the number of Roma in Hungary is grossly underestimated. Nor is 
language a straightforward criterion. Some countries ask about mother tongue, 
which may be a distant and irrelevant fact, whereas others inquire about 
language of daily use (Umgangssprache), which favours the majority language 
wherever minorities work among majorities. Historically too, East Central 
Europe has had its share of minorities defined by non-linguistic, usually 
religious, criteria and it can count individuals who identify with a group whose 
language they do not know.
Assuming the most open census questionnaires, minority statistics will 
still contain significant variations over time. As in all other polls, respondents 
often provide the answer which they imagine, rightly or wrongly, the questioner 
expects. They may do so because they are intimidated, because they wish to 
discourage prying into their personal lives, or because they seek to project a 
particular image of themselves. Self-identification will therefore depend on 
circumstances, political and other. For example, it was imprudent to define 
oneself as German in Poland for much of the post-war era. This ceased to be the 
case for individuals who wished to avail themselves of the possibility of




























































































emigrating to Germany. More recently, it has become a factor of mobility even 
for those who wish to remain in Poland.
Such variations of identity are all the more prevalent and understandable 
in areas where people effectively share more than one identity, whether because 
of personal factors, such as mixed marriages, or political considerations, such as 
border alterations and regime changes. The wisest respondents to questions 
about minority identity may well be those unsophisticated individuals who 




























































































A ppendix  II: S ta tistics
Further to the points we have made above (appendix I). the following statistics provide a 
range of figures. In some cases, we are giving the minimal and maximal plausible figures. In 
other cases, we are leaving open the minimum or the maximum (indicated with a question 













020.000 - 040.000 
app. 007.000 
app. 006.000
? - 200.000 
app. 200.000
450.000 - 800.000
006.000 - ? 
850.000- 1.000.000
































































































































Germans 065.000 - 200.000
Greeks 9 005.000
Jews 080.000 - 100.000
Poles 9 010.000
Roma 400.000 - 800.000
Serbs 9 005.000
































































































































































Pomaks 25.000 - 50.000
Russians 40.000 - 100.000
(& Lippovans)* 




(&  Tatars) 
Ukrainians 070.000-250.000

























































































































Roma 04.000 - 10.000
Serbs app. 50.000
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